Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine has transferred two captured North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea, revealing a new development involving soldiers whose capture had already become a sensitive issue between Kyiv and Seoul.
Zelenskyy made the announcement during his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Reuters reported on September 24, 2026, that Zelenskyy said the two North Korean POWs had recently been sent to the Republic of Korea. The soldiers had been captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025 after being deployed there in support of Russian forces.
The development links the war in Ukraine directly to the Korean Peninsula. It also follows months of discussions between South Korea and Ukraine over the fate of the two soldiers. In June, the two governments agreed to work toward resolving the POW issue in accordance with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting the free will of the individuals involved.
The latest announcement is significant, but several details remain unclear. Zelenskyy did not provide a detailed account of when or how the transfer took place, and the immediate public reporting did not establish all aspects of the soldiers’ current legal status in South Korea.
Zelenskyy told the UN General Assembly that Ukraine had recently sent two North Korean prisoners of war to the Republic of Korea.
“Recently, we sent two North Korean prisoners of war to the Republic of Korea,” Zelenskyy said, according to Reuters.
The statement was notable because the two soldiers had been at the center of a diplomatic and humanitarian question since their capture in early 2025.
Zelenskyy did not provide extensive details about the transfer during his speech. Reuters reported that the Ukrainian president said the two North Koreans had been captured in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025 and were the first North Korean soldiers publicly known to have been captured alive after North Korean personnel entered the Russia-Ukraine war.
The wording of the announcement is important. The transfer was reported by Zelenskyy, meaning the initial public confirmation came from the Ukrainian president. Subsequent reporting from South Korean media also reported the disclosure, while additional details about the transfer remained limited.
The announcement therefore needs to be distinguished from a complete account of the transfer process. It confirms what Zelenskyy said at the UN, while questions remain about the precise arrangements under which the soldiers moved from Ukrainian custody to South Korea.
The two men are North Korean soldiers who were captured by Ukrainian forces after being deployed to Russia’s Kursk region.
Ukraine publicly announced their capture in January 2025. At the time, the two soldiers became the first North Korean combatants publicly identified as having been captured alive by Ukrainian forces. Reuters reported that they had been captured in Kursk while supporting Russian forces.
Their case attracted international attention because North Korea had previously denied or kept limited public information about its military involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, while South Korea was closely monitoring evidence of North Korean personnel operating alongside Russian forces.
The two soldiers were subsequently held by Ukraine. Their identities and personal backgrounds have not been broadly disclosed in reliable public reporting, and details such as their military units, family circumstances and precise assignments should not be assumed without confirmation.
South Korean reporting has said the soldiers expressed a desire to go to South Korea. Yonhap reported in June that the two men had reportedly expressed a wish to defect to South Korea.
That reported preference became an important element of discussions between Seoul and Kyiv.
The two soldiers were deployed to Russia’s Kursk region as part of North Korea’s military support for Moscow.
South Korean and Ukrainian officials have said North Korean personnel were sent to Russia as the countries expanded military cooperation. Yonhap reported in June 2026 that the two soldiers had been deployed to Kursk in support of Moscow before their capture.
Ukrainian forces captured the two North Korean soldiers in January 2025.
The capture occurred in Russia’s Kursk region, an area that had become a major part of the fighting between Russian and Ukrainian forces.
Ukraine publicly disclosed the capture in January 2025.
At the time, the development provided direct evidence that North Korean soldiers had been deployed into the conflict and could be captured on the battlefield.
The two men remained under Ukrainian custody while Kyiv and Seoul discussed possible arrangements for their future.
By June 2026, South Korea and Ukraine had reached an understanding that the issue should be addressed in accordance with international law and humanitarian principles while taking the soldiers’ wishes into account.
The September announcement by Zelenskyy represents the latest publicly reported stage of that process.
The presence of North Korean troops in Russia is part of a broader expansion in military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.
Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June 2024 that included a mutual-defense provision. South Korean and Ukrainian officials subsequently reported the deployment of North Korean personnel to Russia.
Yonhap reported in August 2026 that North Korea was believed to have sent around 20,000 combat troops and military engineers to the Kursk region to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Such figures are estimates rather than independently verified counts of every individual deployed.
The scale of North Korean involvement has been a significant concern for South Korea because it connects the security situation in Europe with developments on the Korean Peninsula.
For Ukraine, North Korean participation provides another example of foreign personnel and military support being involved in Russia’s war.
For Russia and North Korea, the cooperation has developed into a broader strategic relationship involving military assistance and personnel.
The two captured soldiers are therefore not an isolated issue. Their case is part of a larger international debate over North Korea’s military support for Russia.
South Korea’s involvement is unusual because Seoul has a longstanding constitutional position regarding the Korean Peninsula.
The South Korean government has maintained that North Korean residents are constitutionally regarded as South Korean nationals and that Seoul would accept North Korean POWs who wish to come to South Korea.
Yonhap reported that South Korea’s government had maintained this position while discussions with Ukraine continued.
The situation created a complicated legal and humanitarian question.
The two soldiers were North Korean nationals who had been captured while fighting in support of Russia. At the same time, South Korea viewed the individuals through its own constitutional and humanitarian framework.
The soldiers’ reported desire to go to South Korea added another consideration.
Instead of simply returning them to North Korea, Seoul and Kyiv had to discuss how their wishes, international humanitarian law and the wider diplomatic circumstances could be addressed.
That is why the issue continued for months after the original capture.
A major step came on June 30, 2026, when South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun met Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in Seoul.
The two ministers discussed bilateral relations, the Russia-Ukraine war and the North Korean POW issue.
According to South Korea’s Foreign Ministry, the two sides agreed to seek a solution to the POW issue consistent with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting the free will of the individuals concerned.
The June agreement did not itself constitute a transfer.
Instead, it established the diplomatic framework within which the issue would be addressed.
Sybiha said at the time that the two governments had discussed how to proceed in accordance with international humanitarian law. South Korean officials also reiterated that Seoul would accept North Korean POWs who wanted to come to South Korea.
That background helps explain why Zelenskyy’s later announcement about sending the two soldiers to South Korea was more than a routine POW transfer.
It was the outcome of a diplomatic process involving Ukraine, South Korea and the legal status of two North Korean soldiers captured during the war.
South Korean and international reporting has said that the two soldiers expressed a desire to go to South Korea.
Yonhap reported in June that the soldiers had reportedly expressed their wish to defect to South Korea.
South Korean broadcaster SBS likewise reported that the two soldiers had expressed an intention to go to South Korea after their capture.
However, their personal motivations should not be assumed beyond what has been publicly documented.
It is also important not to infer broader political views from their reported decision. The available reporting establishes that they wanted to go to South Korea, but it does not provide a complete account of their individual circumstances.
The reported preference was nevertheless important because it became part of the discussions between Seoul and Kyiv.
The treatment and transfer of prisoners of war are governed by international humanitarian law, including the Third Geneva Convention.
The International Committee of the Red Cross says prisoners of war must be treated humanely and protected against violence, intimidation, insults and public curiosity. Their detention is intended to prevent them from returning to the battlefield rather than to punish them simply for taking part in hostilities.
The Geneva Convention also contains rules governing transfers between powers.
Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention says POWs may be transferred by the detaining power to another power that is party to the Convention, provided the detaining power is satisfied that the receiving power is willing and able to apply the Convention. Responsibility for applying the Convention then rests with the receiving power while the prisoners are in its custody.
Article 118 establishes the general rule that POWs are released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities. The ICRC’s commentary also recognizes that humanitarian circumstances and agreements between parties can affect arrangements involving individual prisoners.
These general principles provide context, but they do not by themselves determine every legal detail of the Ukraine-South Korea case.
The specific circumstances of the two soldiers, their wishes, the continuing conflict and the arrangements between Ukraine and South Korea all matter.
Newz18 therefore does not independently characterize the reported transfer as lawful or unlawful. The relevant governments have described their discussions in terms of international law and humanitarian principles.
The public reporting surrounding the September transfer has focused primarily on statements from Ukraine and South Korea.
No detailed official North Korean response to the reported transfer was immediately available in the Reuters report.
That distinction is important.
It would be premature to claim that North Korea has accepted or rejected the transfer unless its government makes an official statement.
The same caution applies to any interpretation of how Pyongyang may respond to the soldiers’ presence in South Korea.
The two men were captured after being deployed to Russia, and their transfer now adds another diplomatic dimension to the wider Russia-North Korea relationship.
The two soldiers were captured in Russia’s Kursk region while serving in the context of North Korean military support for Russia.
That makes Russia an important part of the story even though the immediate transfer involved Ukraine and South Korea.
The case highlights how Russia’s military relationship with North Korea has produced direct consequences for personnel from the Korean Peninsula.
South Korean officials have linked the expanding Russia-North Korea military relationship to their country’s security concerns. During his June visit to South Korea, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Sybiha also described the Russia-North Korea relationship as having consequences for both the European and Korean security environments.
However, the specific command arrangements under which the two captured soldiers operated have not been fully detailed in the latest public reporting.
It is therefore preferable to describe them as North Korean personnel deployed in support of Russian forces rather than make broader claims about operational control without evidence.
The transfer adds another dimension to Ukraine-South Korea relations.
Seoul has supported Ukraine through humanitarian assistance while maintaining its own policy restrictions on providing lethal weapons. At the same time, South Korea has closely followed North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia.
For Ukraine, the case demonstrates the practical consequences of North Korean military involvement in the war.
For South Korea, the two POWs are directly connected to questions about North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia and the status of North Korean personnel captured abroad.
The June diplomatic discussions also showed that Kyiv and Seoul were developing cooperation beyond the POW question. The two governments discussed bilateral relations, Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and economic cooperation.
The transfer should not, however, be described as proof of a formal military alliance between Ukraine and South Korea. The available reporting does not establish such a development.
The two POWs are part of a wider story involving Russia and North Korea.
Since 2024, Moscow and Pyongyang have significantly expanded military cooperation. Their 2024 strategic partnership agreement included a mutual-defense provision, while South Korean and Ukrainian officials have reported North Korean troop deployments to Russia.
The scale of those deployments remains partly dependent on intelligence assessments and government estimates.
Yonhap reported in August that North Korea was believed to have sent around 20,000 combat troops and military engineers to the Kursk region. The same report noted South Korean concerns about Russia’s military cooperation with North Korea.
The broader relationship also has implications for North Korea’s military capabilities.
South Korean officials have said that cooperation with Russia could give North Korean personnel experience in modern warfare. Zelenskyy has similarly argued that North Korean personnel could gain battlefield experience through the relationship with Moscow. Such assessments should be attributed to the officials making them rather than presented as independently established conclusions.
The POW case demonstrates how developments in the Russia-Ukraine war can intersect with security issues in East Asia.
South Korea is geographically distant from the battlefield in Ukraine, but North Korea’s involvement has created a direct connection.
The deployment of North Korean military personnel to Russia means that North Korean forces are gaining experience and operating outside the Korean Peninsula. South Korean officials have therefore treated the Russia-North Korea military relationship as a security concern.
At the same time, Ukraine has an interest in documenting and highlighting foreign military participation in Russia’s war.
The two POWs consequently sit at the intersection of several issues:
The case illustrates the increasingly international character of the war without establishing what the next stage of the broader conflict will be.
Russia and North Korea deepen their strategic and military relationship, including a mutual-defense provision in their June 2024 partnership agreement.
Ukrainian forces capture two North Korean soldiers in Russia’s Kursk region. Ukraine subsequently makes the capture public.
The two soldiers remain in Ukrainian custody while their future becomes a diplomatic issue involving Kyiv and Seoul.
South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha discuss the POW issue in Seoul. The two countries agree to seek a resolution consistent with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting the individuals’ free will.
During his UN General Assembly address, Zelenskyy says Ukraine has recently sent the two North Korean POWs to South Korea.
Two North Korean soldiers were captured by Ukrainian forces in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025. Ukraine publicly announced their capture, and they became the first North Korean soldiers publicly known to have been captured alive in the war.
South Korea and Ukraine subsequently discussed the soldiers’ future.
In June 2026, Seoul and Kyiv agreed to pursue a solution based on international law and humanitarian principles while respecting the soldiers’ free will.
On September 23-24, Zelenskyy announced that Ukraine had sent the two POWs to South Korea. Reuters reported the announcement on September 24.
Several details have not been fully explained publicly.
These include:
These unanswered questions should be separated from the facts already established by government statements and reporting.
The next stage will depend on official information from Ukraine and South Korea.
Key questions include whether Seoul provides further confirmation or details about the soldiers’ arrival and current status.
Another question is whether North Korea issues an official response.
The legal and diplomatic arrangements surrounding the transfer could also become clearer as the two governments provide additional information.
The wider issue of North Korean military personnel in Russia will remain relevant as well. South Korean officials have continued to monitor Russia-North Korea military cooperation, while Ukrainian officials have raised concerns about additional North Korean deployments.
The transfer does not by itself answer broader questions about the future of Russia-North Korea relations or the Russia-Ukraine war.
For now, the immediate development is the reported movement of the two captured soldiers from Ukraine to South Korea.
The reported transfer of two North Korean POWs to South Korea connects a battlefield development in Russia’s Kursk region with diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula.
The case also demonstrates the practical consequences of North Korea’s military relationship with Russia.
For Ukraine, the two soldiers are evidence of North Korean personnel being captured during the war.
For South Korea, the case involves both the treatment of North Korean nationals and the broader security implications of Pyongyang’s cooperation with Moscow.
For the international community, the case raises questions about the treatment and transfer of prisoners of war, the application of international humanitarian law and the rights and wishes of individual detainees.
The ICRC’s guidance emphasizes humane treatment of POWs and establishes detailed rules for their detention and transfer.
The case also illustrates how the Russia-Ukraine war has developed international connections well beyond Europe.
The two captured soldiers were deployed thousands of miles from the Korean Peninsula. Their eventual reported transfer to South Korea has now brought that connection directly into the diplomatic relationship between Seoul and Kyiv.
For readers, the central distinction remains important: Zelenskyy has announced that the two North Korean POWs were transferred to South Korea, while several details surrounding the transfer remain to be publicly clarified.
Ukraine captured two North Korean soldiers in Russia’s Kursk region in January 2025. They were publicly identified as the first North Korean soldiers captured alive by Ukrainian forces during the war.
The two soldiers were captured in Russia’s Kursk region after being deployed there in support of Russian forces.
Ukraine captured the two soldiers in January 2025, according to Reuters and subsequent reporting.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine had recently sent the two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea.
Zelenskyy announced the transfer during his address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Reuters reported his statement on September 24, 2026.
The soldiers were deployed to Russia’s Kursk region as part of North Korea’s military support for Moscow in its war against Ukraine. South Korean and Ukrainian officials have reported broader North Korean military involvement in Russia.
South Korea has maintained that North Korean soldiers are constitutionally regarded as South Korean nationals and that Seoul would accept POWs who wish to come to South Korea.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine had transferred them to South Korea. The public reporting available at the time of his announcement did not provide every detail about their current legal and administrative status.
South Korea had previously said it would accept North Korean POWs who wanted to come to the country. Seoul and Kyiv also agreed in June 2026 to seek a solution consistent with international law and humanitarian principles while respecting the soldiers’ free will.
The Third Geneva Convention contains rules governing the treatment and transfer of POWs. Article 12 allows transfer to another party to the Convention under specified conditions, while Article 118 addresses release and repatriation after active hostilities.
The precise legal application to an individual case depends on the facts and arrangements involved.
No detailed official North Korean response to the reported September 2026 transfer was immediately available in the Reuters report. Any later statement should be evaluated separately and attributed to the North Korean government or state media.
South Korean and Ukrainian officials have reported broader North Korean military involvement in Russia. Estimates of the number of personnel vary, and such figures should be treated as government or intelligence assessments rather than exact independently verified totals. Yonhap reported in August that North Korea was believed to have sent around 20,000 combat troops and military engineers to the Kursk region.